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THE FREEDOM TO DIE

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LABOR AND THE ELECTION JOE HILL
THE TRUMAN ANALOGY PETER STEINFELS
TACTILE POLITICS THOMAS F. HEFFERNAN

CRACKS IN THE BURGER COURT
ISIDORE SILVER

SCREEN: COLIN L. WESTERBECK on HITCHCOCK'S FRENZY **REVIEWS: DENNIS HALE** on THE NEW POPULISM **STANLEY HOFFMAN** on KENNEDY, COLD WARRIOR **GERARD S. SLOYAN** on NEW JESUS BOOKS **CORRESPONDENCE:** CATHOLICS AND THE AMISH

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NEWS & VIEWS

Ehrlich vs. Commoner

Science magazine, weekly journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and on top of so many things these days (e.g., the fire-storm projects in Vietnam), probes the tensions between the two biggies of ecology, Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner, in its July 21 issue.

"Ehrlich has been attempting to put the debate on a purely scientific basis," writes *Science's* Constance Holden, "whereas Commoner considers politics to be very much a part of the equation. When you're playing bridge and your opponent's playing poker, it's hard to agree on rules."

The Ehrlich-Commoner dispute has been going on for the last two years, and centers about what factor or combination of factors poses the most serious threat to the environment. Ehrlich, a Stanford population biologist and author of *The Population Bomb*, believes that nothing will curb deterioration of the ecosphere unless population growth is immediately slowed. Commoner, author of *The Closing Circle* and to some the "Paul Revere of ecology," thinks the population question has been overblown and that the real villain is the misuse of technology; he opposes any population policy that even implies coercion in lowering the birthrate.

Ehrlich and Commoner have been attacking one another's positions in a variety of forums, and are at the point now, according to one reading, where each is "spending valuable time figuring out ways to embarrass the other."

(Ehrlich's assistant, Paul Growald, for instance, accuses Commoner of being responsible for the reshaping of a Stockholm panel on which Ehrlich was to have discussed population with a Swede and a Senegalese. When Ehrlich arrived he found himself in a 7-to-1 situation and showered with hostile questions from the floor, many of which questions were said to have been supplied by Commoner himself. Commoner dismisses the charges as "scurrilous.")

How does the scientific community line up on the dispute?

Demographers and social scientists are said to tend toward the Commoner view, while physical scientists lean toward Ehrlich.

At the same time, there is the suggestion that the environmentalists and scientists are becoming terribly impatient with the Ehrlich-Commoner contention, presumably because it conveys the impression that the sum total of environmental rightness and wrongness is bound up in the positions of the two.

Further, as demographer Ansley Coale is cited, ideological commitments on both sides are obscuring the scientific questions. Commoner "is sort of mystical about the balance of nature and somehow absolves the role of population growth," while Ehrlich, "a real missionary on ZPG" [zero population growth] is regarded by many demographers as being to population what the Women's Christian Temperance Union is to alcohol.

Ehrlich is reported to be "depressed" over the counterproductive nature of the controversy, and anxious to "bury the hatchet." In this context, *Science* notes Ehrlich's recent press release suggesting that he and Commoner start working together on areas of mutual agreement, specifically, "the detection and correction of faulty technologies and on finding ways to a more equitable distribution of wealth."



Richard Larson/LNS

This may mark the end of an increasingly acrimonious debate, remarks *Science*, but it adds that "a harmonious partnership is hardly in the offing." The complication, by implication: Commoner.

"Commoner, on hearing of Ehrlich's intentions, denied any hard feelings," *Science* continues. "'If he wants to bury his hatchet, fine. I have no hatchet to bury; my task is to discuss the *issues*, as I see them, which I shall continue to do, as I have done in the past,'" Commoner is quoted.

Britain's Gen. Walker

Generals are apparently the same in all armies, so it is not surprising to read a British general's prescription for ending the trouble in Northern Ireland; General Sir Walter Walker could be one of our own talking about the trouble in Vietnam.

"We should cut off their petrol, gas, electricity and stop food going in, soften them up and then go in," says General Walker. "Give warning so that they can get their women and children away before we go in, but go in."

The general obviously draws on a wealth of experience. "I have engaged in campaigns against blacks, yellows and slant-eyes," explains Walker. "Why should we have one rule for the whites and one for the coloreds?"

Fortunately for all concerned, Walker is not directing operations in Northern Ireland; he recently retired from the British Army and, like so many of his counterparts, blew off steam at a parting press conference on how the world would be a safer place if only generals were given their heads.

Walker, a former commander of NATO land forces in Northern Europe, was also disapproving that the Russians maintain a fleet at Murmansk and station troops near the Norwegian-Russian frontier. (Britain, and presumably Walker too, was everywhere East and West of Suez until Britain went broke, but, of course, that's another matter.)

What's Britain doing about these internal affairs of Russia? To Walker's dismay, nothing. "The United Kingdom is on the doorstep of all this," he remarks, "and we are playing cricket on the lid of our own coffin."

It's the kind of mentality to make you pray passionately for civilian control over the military, here and everywhere. The Strangeloves, obviously, are no national breed. They're universal.

Auf Wiedersehen, H&H

The Book-of-the-Month Club newsletter reports that McGraw-Hill plans a rapid consolidation of its publishing house imprints (McGraw-Hill, American Heritage Press and Herder & Herder). "The staffs will meld, title duplication will be eliminated, and the Herder & Herder imprint will vanish." Thus the götterdämmerung for one of the last of the major Catholic houses in New York publishing.

Odds and Ends

—Wilfrid Sheed's opening for his *New York Review* essay on the Mafia boomlet: "As with God in the late Middle Ages, all that there is to know about the Mafia seems to be known by now except whether it actually exists."

—Liberation News Service's opening for its story reporting Senator Hugh Scott's intention to nominate Richard Nixon for the Nobel Peace Prize: "In a move unprecedented for its glaring illogic. . . ." JOHN DEEDY

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CORRESPONDENCE

The Amish Case

Livonia, Mich.

To the Editors: May I point out that your article "Catholics and the Amish" [June 16] lacks familiarity with the background of the case.

The article which was concerned with the United States Supreme Court's decision exempting the Amish from high school attendance asserted, "Neither side has dealt with the main question —how do we best protect the rights of the children within their familial, religious and political contexts?" If the author had bothered to read attorney Ball's brief in defense of the Amish or any of the trial record, he would have seen how the rights of the Amish children were a prime concern of ours. Our defense was a triangle which considered the legitimate interests of children. Only Mr. Justice Douglas was interested in the issue of children's rights which we raised—the rest of the court explicitly stated that since the parents were the ones being fined for their religious beliefs, the decision would rest on parental rights. I had felt that the wishes of the children should be considered and had carefully interviewed each one of them. Each stated that it was his own desire and wish to follow the Amish religion, to be trained in the Amish community for adult baptism, and to follow the Amish farm vocation. They each stated that they did not wish to continue any longer in the New Glarus school system. The attorney, therefore, placed a representative Amish teenager on the stand, who, in effect, asked the court to protect her own religious liberty to follow her faith irrespective of the rights of her parents.

We also retained the world's leading authority on the Amish culture, Dr. John Hostetler of Temple University, who had just completed a three-year study for the United States Office of Education. He testified that the Amish tested above the norm on basic skills when compared to regular rural public

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THE EAGLETON DECISION

When Presidential nominee George McGovern finally called Missouri Senator Thomas Eagleton, less than half an hour inside the deadline for filing the name of the Vice-Presidential candidate, Eagleton was quick to respond: "Senator, before I give you a chance to change your mind, I accept." We can understand Eagleton's haste, and his joy. As an intense and personable young man, he had driven himself hard. He had reached out for early success and achieved it, but at enormous cost—exhaustion, depression, and a series of three hospitalizations over six years, with the true nature of his illness covered-up by his staff. Now, six years after his recovery, a series of circumstances—his Catholicism, friendship with labor, his urban-midwestern home base, his wit and amiability—had brought early success within his grasp again. The past, it seemed for a few fleeting days, had been conquered: he was to be a leader in the new revolution and America was to have, for the first time in years, a Vice President who was also a liberal, tolerant and dignified man. But it was not to be. A big man's past refuses to die. The McGovern managers and the nation learned, to their embarrassment and confusion, that the charming young man from Missouri was not quite the man they thought he was. Now, just as a combination of happy circumstances had brought Eagleton suddenly into the bright sunlight of instant fame, another combination of hard political realities had made it imperative that he withdraw.

The decision for Eagleton to withdraw was as the decision had to be. The arguments for retaining Eagleton did not hold up. It meant little to say that an Eagleton with a history of mental illness was still more stable than Nixon or Agnew. Thousands of Americans are more stable than Nixon or Agnew. Nor did it illuminate the problem to point to the physical and psychological problems of past Presidents—Adams, Lincoln, Wilson. With all their greatness, they were men of a simpler age. We have worried too much over President Nixon's stability under stress to be reassured by Eagleton's promise that he can "pace himself' with fishing and swimming. Very often the pace of events is not up to the candidate or the President. The generally worded reassurances from associations of psychologists and psychiatrists were not compelling. On the other hand, Dr. Mortimer Ostow, author of *The Psychology of Melancholy,* argued in a letter to *The New York Times*

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[July 28] that in Eagleton's case the possibility of relapse was too great to risk Eagleton in the Presidency. Nor was this the time to wage a five-month national campaign to educate an unsophisticated public to a better understanding of mental illness. The Democratic party does not have the time or the resources to convince America that a broken spirit is the same as a broken arm—even if that were true.

Under heavy grilling, as newsmen and television viewers scrutinized every drop of perspiration on his brow and every tremor in his hands Eagleton came across as a sincere and straightforward man who did not fully grasp the hard realities or the complexities of his situation. In his attempts to defend his position on the ticket, his wit sometimes exceeded his candor. He may not have considered his hospitalization a "skeleton" in his closet, but he should have understood how others would see it and he should have told McGovern about it sooner. He revealed very little about his current condition by describing his nervous stomach in terms of the Alka-Seltzer ads or the effects of too much spaghetti, or his medication as a "blue pill" of which he could not learn the name. He had promised his doctors would issue a statement, but a week later, we were still waiting. His statement that Jack Anderson's unsubstantiated and therefore irresponsible report that he had been arrested for drunken driving had made him doubly determined to stay in the race was completely without logic, as was his claim that he should stay on because he had given politics sixteen years of his life. Furthermore, his assertion that his warm receptions in Honolulu, San Francisco and Missouri proved that he was now a greater political asset than ever seemed to say more about his enthusiastic state of mind than his political judgment.

This has been a painful week in American history. Any sensitive person shrinks from the responsibility of suggesting that a Vice-Presidential nominee should step aside, even when this personal sacrifice is required for some greater good. But, as George McGovern has often said about Vietnamfi the only way to rectify a mistake is to reverse it. Finally, Senator Eagleton was being asked by his party to be doubly brave: to summon up the same strength and common sense that led him to seek psychiatric help years ago and acknowledge that the party could not fight two momentous battles—the battle to defeat Richard Nixon and the battle for Tom Eagleton's personal vindication—at the same time. By his gracious withdrawal he has won a triumph of the spirit.

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LABOR AND THE ELECTION

MEANY'S LAST STAND

For Richard Nixon, who has been the devil incarnate for the nation's labor press for most of the past three years, it wasn't a bad week so far as labor was concerned. On Monday portly Frank Fitzsimmons adjourned a meeting of the executive board of the Teamsters Union at Rancho la Costa and journeyed to the Western White House, where he delivered in person the endorsement of the ruling body of the nation's largest union.

"The board felt the backing of Mr. Nixon was in the best interest of labor and the rest of the country," said Mr. Fitzsimmons. (Through Nixon-style finesse or through the labors of a disgruntled Democrat, the Justice Department that morning had announced that it had "no case" in a misuse of union funds indictment against Fitzsimmons' son, a Detroit Teamster official.) Reached by reporters, Teamster President-Emeritus Jimmy Hoffa also thought it was a good decision. More significantly, on the same day the Administration suddenly withdrew its demand for a strike-ban bill in the transportation industry.

But the best was yet to come. Not in his wildest game-planning with John Mitchell could Nixon have foreseen that his bitter antagonist, George Meany, would actually sit the election out. After the Teamsters had their day, the AFL-CIO Executive Council met and resolved what all the insiders had been telling the press the previous 48 hours. Self-fulfilling prophecies, in fact, had been a large part of the scenario at Miami Beach the week previous: McGovern can't win in November; labor will never support McGovern if he is nominated; the McGovern people were arrogant and ignored the labor delegates at Miami; the suburban and student elitists have taken over the Democratic party and have arrogantly excluded members of the old coalition. Someone pointed out that the releases being issued by Clark MacGregor, Mitchell's successor at GOP headquarters, were hard to distinguish from those issued at AFL-CIO headquarters.

There are those who maintain that the labor delegates, reduced to a hard core of ten percent of the Convention, went to Florida prepared to board a political Titanic regardless of the outcome. After the California primary it was all downhill with Hubert Humphrey, and the loss of the delegate challenge on the opening day was a signal of their demise as power brokers. The abortive substitution of "Scoop" Jackson, who has only a little more color and a little less humor than a Frank Rizzo, was further evidence of just how far had the once-respected AFL-CIO political strategists retreated from reality.

Consider the ensuing mini-events from a psychological, rather than from a political vantage point: denounced

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as a "77-year-old labor curmudgeon" by liberal columnists, editorially assailed as the king of the "nabobs of labor" by the *New York Times,* portrayed in ludicrous poses at poolside and bellbottomed in the lobby at Miami's Americana Hotel, the man who participated in the top decision-making of half a dozen Presidential campaigns is reduced to watching the affair on television. His chief political operative, Al Barkan, is denied access to the Convention floor, and throws his hands up and sprints away when a network interviewer approaches him. "No one paid any attention to me at this convention," laments another top official of the Federation. "I felt as if I were at a Republican convention."

The bitterness was not tempered by the real or imagined humiliation which most of the labor delegates shared in the first three days of the proceedings, and the withdrawal of Humphrey was the culmination of what had to be a violent political trauma. It was symbolic if anticlimactic, and those who were with the Minnesotan when he made his announcement must have known that it was labor's Waterloo as well. Their rage was only increased when an insensitive corps of reporters denied Humphrey the privacy which even public men have earned at a moment of desolation.

Little had dissipated in the week between the ignominy of Convention Hall and the emptiness of the Americana, where the veteran players had not even been invited to sit at the table with their chips. Few doubted the outcome, for the dissents had already been on record and those who wavered at Dante's hottest spot simply stayed away (two of them—heading the Machinists and the Communication Workers—said they would urge support for McGovern by their unions). It was, as Jerry Wurf of the Government Workers put it, "a reflection of personal loyalities within the Council rather than a true index of support for the Democratic ticket." Something like Dean Rusk or the Senate on Vietnam. Saving face.

But George Meany was without his cocky give-and-take with the press in the brief meeting after the Council vote. He was, he said, speaking for himself. Although he headed a federation representing unions with a membership of 13.5-million people, and getting out the vote had been its credo as much as a full pay envelope, he was not going to vote for either Nixon or McGovern in November. He declined questions which sought to probe the "circumstances" by which the AFL-CIO was recommending a sit-out in the campaign against the President it had been bad-mouthing for three years. He even lamented the absence of "old Norman Thomas" as an electoral alternative; but, as reporter John Herling noted after the conference, Meany has admitted that he voted for Tom Dewey in 1944. (Some of those who carry on the show of "old Norman's" Socialist party acknowledged preparing the anonymous hatchet job on McGovern at Miami.)

Hadn't you said anyone but George Wallace and John Lindsay, Mr. Meany? No comment. Did not Senator McGovern address your AFL-CIO convention last November, and didn't he receive at least three standing ovations from some 1200 delegates representing your 120 affiliated unions? Does the AFL-CIO normally ask those with "anti-labor" records to address it in convention?

If it was a last stand of the Old Politics, the nominee of the New was riding horseback—in Custer, South Dakota, of course. He wanted no feud with Mr. Meany, but what was important was the rank-and-file, McGovern said. He noted that the heads of unions with five or more million members had already endorsed him, and that the executive boards or conventions of a dozen others had taken similar action even before the AFL-CIO had convened.

Everybody will play the rank-and-file game, with or without formal endorsements or with a non-endorsement. The potential for electoral disaster for McGovern because of the AFL-CIO sit-out may not be as final as Meany and some of his closest associates apparently firmly believe. Frank Mankiewicz, who has called the crucial shots correctly for McGovern so far, reportedly believes that a disassociation with Meany in a protest year is a plus. Others, viewing the depleted McGovern finances and still-building organizations in such key states as Ohio, Pennsylvania and Illinois, shudder over the prospect of working the blue-collar circuit without labor money and contacts.

What is likely, regardless of the outcome in November, is that George Meany could well become a prophet scorned in his own house. In no way does his style or his sincerity match John L. Lewis' "a plague on both your houses" of 32 years ago. Yet the lesson may not be lost: like Lewis, Meany's decision to become labor's *enfant terrible* in 1972 may presage a withdrawal from the realities of political life in America. It will be little consolation to Meany foes and friends alike, that in the process he could well decisively destroy the credibility and effectiveness of the trade union political apparatus. Observing, Richard Nixon must be asking—with enemies like these and developments like the Eagleton affair, who needs John Mitchell? JOE HILL

(Joe Hill is the pseudonym of a journalist specializing in labor affairs.)

Summer Schedule

In keeping with the usual practice, *Commonweal* is again appearing on alternate weeks during the summer months. Forthcoming issues will be dated August 25, September 8, and September 22. From then on we will resume our normal weekly publishing schedule.

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THE TRUMAN ANALOGY: HOW VALID?

PETER STEINFELS

HISTORICAL ANALOGIES, a tricky game at any time, has been played with even less imagination than usual in recent weeks. Virtually the only comparison that commentators on Senator McGovern's prospects have been able to devise is with the disastrous Goldwater campaign of 1964. Perhaps it is lingering professional embarrassment over the classic case of a miscalled election that keeps them from stretching back to 1948. They might refresh their memories by glancing at Eric F. Goldman's lively account of those years in *The Crucial Decade*.

The scene opens in July, 1948, and the Democrats are worried: "They already had their man in the White House and he emphatically wanted to stay there. The trouble was that in all the United States there was scarcely a politician, a pundit, or plain citizen who believed that Harry Truman could, by the remotest chance, under foreseeable circumstances, win the election of 1948.

"Powerful segments of opinion in the South, that usual bedrock of Democratic strength, were furious at the Administration for its civil-rights drive and by convention time were moving toward a third, 'Dixiecrat Party.' In the North, devotees of Henry Wallace were launching a 'Progressive Party' and were talking—not without evidence—of taking at least six million votes from the Democratic column in crucial states. North or South, among Democrats or Republicans, the mention of Truman for another four years was likely to produce a sad shaking of the head if not a snort.

"As the Democratic convention came on, with Harry Truman announcing that it would be Harry Truman on the first ballot, leaders from all wings of the party frantically sought to escape him." Goldman describes how "a crazy-quilt coalition of big-city bosses, New Dealish politicos, and Southern machine leaders" desperately labored to convince Eisenhower to stand for the Democractic nomination. When Eisenhower telegraphed his definitive refusal, Goldman records that "Boss Frank Hague read the Eisenhower telegram and crunched out his cigar. 'Truman, Harry Truman. Oh my God.' "

Truman did win on the first ballot, and the rest of course is perfectly well remembered.

Historical Analogies, as I said, is a tricky game. It can easily become a kind of intellectual hat trick: you pull your Goldwater out of your hat, I slip my Truman out of mine. Anyone who wishes to take such analogies more seriously ought to be prepared to specify just wherein the analogy lies and also—history never repeating itself—exactly how the two cases differ. The striking resemblance between the Truman and McGovern candidacies is not only that the pollsters predicted disaster for both, but that the professional politicians did, as well. In both instances the Democratic party struck the knowledgeable as fragmented beyond the point where victory was possible. Finally the very act splitting the party—over the civil-rights plank which sent the Dixiecrats marching behind Strom Thurmond—gave Truman access to a Northern Negro vote which not even F.D.R. had rolled up, and which some commentators have seen as the margin of his victory.

But then there are the differences. First, Truman was the incumbent (although, in 1948, not many observers were willing to see that as an advantage). Second, he ran on the strength of the party's center—labor, blacks, white ethnics, big-city machines—while the Wallace left and the Dixiecrat right split off. Third, he had the momentum of the Roosevelt years—the New Deal and the war—behind him. So many Americans had never cast a Republican vote, and so many other Americans could not forget that the last one they had cast was for Herbert Hoover.

So if the Truman analogy is to mean anything for McGovern besides the fallibility of our Public Prophets, it means rallying the Democratic center with the party's traditional themes. The Nixon "gameplan"—where has that word gone into hiding recently, anyway?—is obviously to fight *and* switch, i.e., to concentrate on getting traditional Democratic voters (especially Jewish, Catholic and blue-collar) to switch to the President. The vote thereby gained for the Nixon column is one dropped out of the McGovern column; and to compensate for it, McGovern must pick up *two* votes from the new youth or black constituency.

Nixon has begun his campaign for Democratic support in a way which demonstrates the sharp limits of the Republican party's ability to handle such an assignment: as emissary to the Democrats he has sent John Connally, oil millionaire, wheeler-dealer, Texas baron, friend of Big Business, and closely associated with Administration economic policies discriminating against labor. What would Harry Truman have done with that?

In view of the Great Eagleton Episode, obviously "Give 'em hell George," is not the simple solution to all of McGovern's problems. He has to persuade the nation that the profound unease it feels about its direction would be relieved by finally doing the right thing about the war and by continuing rather than indefinitely postponing the search for justice and equality. To do this he will have to speak the symbolic language of the nation ("Come home, America!"); but also, along the way, he will have to speak the symbolic language of his party; to remind its oldest followers that, when all is said and done, Republicans still don't make very good Democrats, even when, as in the case of John Connally, they are Democrats.

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THE FREEDOM TO DIE

DANIEL MAGUIRE

By working creatively, and in ways as yet unthought of, the lobby of the dying and the gravely ill could become a healing force in society

Of old when men lay sick and sorely tried,
The doctors gave them physic and they died:
But here's a happier age, for now we know
Both how to make men sick and keep them so!
Hilaire Belloc

Man is the only animal who knows he is going to die and he has borne this privileged information with uneven grace. On the one hand poets and philosophers have gazed at death and proclaimed the significance of death-consciousness. Hegel saw the awareness of mortality as such a stimulus to human achievement that he could define history as "what man does with death." Schopenhauer called death "the muse of philosophy" and Camus saw man's capacity for suicide as evoking the most fundamental philosophical questions. Poets have called death such things as "gentle night," "untimely frost," or "the great destroyer."

The average person, however, would rather forget it. This is especially true if the average person is an American since in this happiness-oriented land, death (outside of a military context) is seen as something of an un-American activity. It happens, of course, but it is disguised and *sub rosa,* like sex in Victorian England. Most Americans now die in hospitals. And they die without the benefit of the liturgies of dying that attend this natural event in cultures which accept death as a fact of human life. The dying process is marked by deceit where everything except the most important fact of impending death can be addressed. When the unmentionable happens, the deceit goes on as the embalmers embark on their *post mortem* cosmetics to make the dead man look alive. Mourners, chemically fortified against tears that would betray the farce, recite their lines about how well the dead man looks when, in point of fact, he is not well and does not look it.

All of this does not supply the atmosphere in which man's moral right to die with dignity can receive its needed re-evaluation. Nevertheless, the re-evaluation must go on. Technology has already moved ahead of both ethics and law. As Johns Hopkins professor Diana Crane notes, "the nature of dying has changed qualitatively in recent years because of advances in medical knowledge and technology." These qualitative changes have dissipated older definitions of death, given greater power to doctors over life and death, shaken the never too fine art of prognosis, and presented all us mortals with options that old law and ethical theory did not contemplate . . . which options offer frontal challenges to some long-tenured traditions and taboos.

As if this were not complicated enough, the technological revolution has also caused a notable shift in our moral universe. The interplay between technology and morality is, of course, as old as man's first primitive tool. With technological advance comes power and with power, responsibility, and the question of whether this power can be used without intrusion into the realm of the gods. Prometheus, the philanthropic god who stole fire for men, was judged by Zeus to have gone too far. Bellerophon in the Iliad came to a sorry end for trying to ride to the Olympus of the gods and for thinking "thoughts too great for man." And Icarus, exulting in the technology of man-made wings, flew too close to the sun and perished. These myths, like the myths of Babel and Adam's sin, are relevant to the moral dilemma of inventive man. What thoughts and what initiatives are

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"too great for man"? Where are the sacred borders between the *can do* and the *may do?* Where does presumption enter into the knowledge of good and evil?

Medical ethics has long known the strain of this dilemma. Man has a tendency to consider the physical and biological to be ethically normative and inviolable. Blood transfusions were resisted by many on these grounds. Birth control was also, for a very long time, impeded by the physicalist ethic that left moral man at the mercy of his biology. He had no choice but to conform to the rhythms of his physical nature and to accept its determinations obediently. Only gradually did technological man discover that he was morally free to intervene creatively and to achieve birth control by choice.

Can We Intervene?

The question now arising is whether, in certain circumstances, we may intervene creatively to achieve death by choice or whether mortal man must in all cases await the good pleasure of biochemical and organic factors and allow these to determine the time and the manner of his demise. In more religious language, can the will of God regarding a person's death be manifested only through the collapse of sick or wounded organs or could it also be discovered through the sensitivities and reasonings of moral men? Could there be circumstances when it would be acutely reasonable (and therefore moral if one uses "reason" in a Thomistic sense) to terminate life through either positive action or calculated benign neglect rather than to await in awe the dispositions of organic tissue?

The discussion should proceed in the realization that the simpler days are past in which the ethics of dying was simple. Most importantly, the definition of death was no problem until recently. When the heart stopped beating and a person stopped breathing, he was dead. (Interestingly, the old theology manuals were not too sure of this since they advised that the sacrament of final anointing could be administered conditionally up to about two hours after "death.") Medical technology has changed all of that. It is now commonplace to restore palpitation to a heart that had fully stopped beating. Even when the natural capacity for cardiopulmonary activity is lost, these systems can be kept functioning through the aid of supplementary machinery. Heartbeat and breathing can be artificially maintained in a person whose brain is crushed or even deteriorated to the point of liquefaction. Heartbeat is no longer a safe criterion of human life!

This has turned medical people to the concept of "brain death." Indeed, Dr. Robert Glaser, the Dean of Stanford's School of Medicine says (somewhat prematurely, I judge): "Insofar as it involves organ donors and their rights, the technical question of death has been resolved, by popular consensus, in the recognition that the brain and not the heart is the seat of human life." Brain death, however, is not an answer without problems. A person with a hopelessly damaged brain could still have spontaneous heartbeat and respiration. Harvard's Dr. Henry Beecher asks the inevitable question here: "Would you bury such a man whose heart was beating?" And lawyers will be quick to tell you that the removal of vital organs from a body that has a dead brain but a live heart would raise the specter of legal liability.

All of this illumines the unsettling fact that death admits of degrees. Some organs and cells die before others. As Paul Ramsey observes, "the 'moment' of death is only a useful fiction." It may however be more fiction than useful if it leaves us hoping for a definition of death that will make it unnecessary for us to judge that a particular "life" should now be completely terminated by a positive act of omission or commission. Science will not give us a litmus test for death that will relieve us of all need for moral judgment and action. That day has passed and that is what makes for the qualitative change in dying and the ethics thereof.

It seems well to pursue this issue by considering four different dying situations: 1) the case of the irreversibly comatose patient whose life is sustained by artificial means; 2) the conscious patient whose life is supported artificially by such means as dialysis (for kidney patients) or iron lung; 3) the conscious patient who is dying of a terminal illness whose life is supported by natural means; 4) the case of self-killing in a non-medical context.

First, then, to the case of the irreversibly comatose, artificially sustained patient. It is a useful beginning here to look at the remarkable address of Pius XII on the prolongation of life, given in 1957. In this talk, the Pope stated that the definition of death is an open question to which "the answer cannot be deduced from any religious and moral principle. . . ." He allows that in hopelessly unconscious patients on respirators "the soul may already have left the body" and he refers to such patients by the ambiguous but interesting term "virtually dead." The Pope points out that only ordinary means need be used to preserve life and he supplies a broad definition of this slippery term saying that ordinary means are "means that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another." The Pope is dealing with the unconscious patient of whom it can be said that "only automatic artificial respiration is keeping him alive." In these hopeless cases, the Pope concludes that after several days of unsuccessful attempts, there is no moral obligation to keep the respirator going.

The respirator is, of course, an extraordinary means especially when it is used on the irreversibly unconscious. For years now theologians have also argued that even intravenous feedings in this type of case is extraordinary and may be discontinued. (Law lags behind ethics on

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this.) I would argue further that in such a case where the personality is permanently extinguished, one needs a justifying cause to continue artificial, supportive measures. To maintain bodily life at a vegetative level without cause is irrational, immoral and a violation of the dignity of human life. It is a burden on the family; also, there may be need to allocate these medical resources to curable awaiting patients. It is, moreover, macabre, irreverent and crudely materialistic to preserve by medical pyrotechnics the hopeless presence of what could best be described as a breathing corpse. Of these cases, when the patient is "irretrievably inaccessible to human care," Paul Ramsey says quite correctly that it is "a matter of complete indifference whether death gains the victory over the patient in such impenetrable solitude by direct or indirect action."

One reason that clearly justifies maintaining this kind of life is to make possible the donation of organs since the human body thus sustained is considered to be the best possible tissue bank. Death however, should first be declared and the law should be pushed to update itself to allow for this. Probably our society is not pre-

pared to grant that the organs in such instances should, by eminent domain, be allocated to those who need them. Through cultural conditioning and taboo we are still disposed to prefer the "rights" of the dead to the needs of the living in this regard, and few people even carry donor cards now legal and available in all states. Thus the immoral waste of tissue that could be "a gift of life."

Our second case concerns the conscious patient whose life is artificially supported. This is a broad category and could be stretched to include those who attribute their perdurance to superabundant dosages of Vitamin C and E. We are thinking, rather, of those who are alive thanks to dialysis or an iron lung. As medicine advances this category will expand.

In assessing the moral right of such patients to die, one might be tempted to repair to the facile distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. By the papal definition of ordinary means ("grave burden for oneself or another") both dialysis and the iron lung are extraordinary. Thus the patients involved would appear to be under no obligation to continue in this kind of therapy and would seem free to discontinue the treatment and die.

We must, however, avoid the simplistic allurements of a one-rubric ethics. There is more involved here than the patient and the extraordinary means. We must (as does the papal teaching cited) speak also of the patient's obligations of social justice and charity, remembering that an individualistic, asocial ethics has also infected medical morality.

We have all heard much of the redemptive power of suffering. Unfortunately, the pieties of the past often interpreted this in accord with primitive myths of vindication which implied that pain and bloodshed of themselves had an atoning power. These myths, replete as they may be with sado-masochistic elements, have had an enormous influence both on Christology and Christian asceticism, attributing a positive *per se* value to suffering. Such a value suffering does not have, but rather assumes its meaning, value, or disvalue from the concrete circumstances of the sufferer.

In this sense there *can* be a redemptive value to suffering. Take the example of a kidney patient who has not had a successful transplant. Could he not see his plight as a vocation? His disease can become a rostrum and he could become part of something that is needed . . . a lobby of the dying and the gravely ill. To be more specific, this nation which has borne him is also ill. Its priorities are out of joint. It has, by morbid selection, chosen for itself what Richard Barnet calls "an economy of death." Its heart is so askew that only if dialysis could be shown to have *military* significance would it receive the government and private funding it desperately needs. Many illnesses could now be contained if the nation had given the zeal and the budget to life that it now gives to death.

The gravely ill with their unique credentials could do more here than they realize. By working creatively with politicians, national health organizations, medical and legal societies, news media, writers, etc.—and in ways as yet unthought of which their healthy imaginations will bring forth—the lobby of the dying and the gravely ill could become a healing force in society. Man's nature is still so barbarous that the well attend more to the well than to the sick. Great obligations, therefore, devolve upon the sick. The well need the sick more than the well know.

Still, concerning persons in the category here discussed, if their artificially supported life becomes unbearable, they have a right to discontinue treatment and we owe them in justice and in charity the direct or indirect means to leave this life with the dignity, comfort and speed which they desire .

What then of the conscious, terminal patient whose life systems are functioning naturally? May he in any circumstance take direct, positive action to shorten his dying trajectory or is the natural course of his disease ethically normative in an absolute sense? Those who would deny the moral right to direct acceleration of the

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death process will adduce an "absolute" principle such as the unconditional inviolability of innocent human life. This is taken to mean that innocent life may in no circumstance be terminated by direct, positive action.

John Milhaven, in an important 1966 *Theological Studies* article, notes the tendency simply to proclaim this inviolability principle and work from there in right-to-life cases. He cites the failure of those who do this to indicate "the reasons that prove there is an absolute inviolability, holding under all circumstances." And he asks the fair and telling question: "How do we know this?" In point of fact, I submit that we do not know this because it is not knowable.

Those who use the principle accept no burden of proof and offer only a fideistic assertion. They present the principle without proof, as self-evident. In ethics, however, only the most generic propositions are self-evident, such as "do good and avoid evil"; "to each his own." The *evidence* emerges from the mere understanding of the terms. Such statements are universally true because they lack particularizing and complicating content.

Practical principles such as the one on direct termination of innocent life must be proved and the proof must come from wherever moral meaning is found. That is, it must come from a knowledge of the morally significant empirical data, the consequences, the existent alternatives, the unique circumstances of person, place and time, etc. Moral meaning is found not just in principles but in all the concrete circumstances that constitute the reality of a person's situation, and the principles themselves are rooted in empirical experience and must be constantly rewashed in an empirical bath to check their abiding validity.

To say that something is morally right or wrong in all possible circumstances implies a divine knowledge of all possible circumstances and their moral meaning. To say that something is universally good or bad regardless of circumstances is non-sense, for it is to say that something is *really* good or bad regardless of the *reality-constituting* circumstances.

An attempt can be made to base the "no direct killing of innocent life principle" on the reality of expected intolerable consequences. This is the cracked dike argument. *Après moi le déluge!* If *X* is allowed, then *Y* and Z and everything else will allowed. This is a kind of ethical domino theory which has the deficiencies of any domino theory. It ignores the real meaning of the real differences between *X*, *Y* and *Z*. Good ethics is based on reality and makes real distinctions where there are real differences. It is, furthermore, fallacious to say that if an exception is allowed, it will be difficult to draw the line and therefore no exception should be allowed. It has been said quite rightly that ethics like art is precisely a matter of knowing where to draw lines.

Therefore, with regard to the principle in question, we can say that its absoluteness is at the very least, doubtful. And then in accord with the hallowed moral axiom *ubi dubium ibi libertas* (where there is doubt there is liberty) we can proclaim moral freedom to terminate life directly in certain cases. It would perhaps be better to put it in terms of Aristotelian-Thomistic moral theory. This principle, like every practical moral principle, is valid most of the time *(in pluribus)* but in a particular instance *(in aliquo particulari)* it may not be applicable.

To apply this whole discussion to the case of conscious terminal patients, it can be said that in certain cases, direct positive intervention to bring on death may be

morally permissible. The decision, of course, should not ignore issues of social responsibility and opportunity alluded to in the preceding case. The patient must consider also his cultural and legal context, the mind-set of insurance companies, and the ability of others to cope with the voluntary aspects of his death. He must also beware lest he is yielding to societal pressures to measure human dignity in terms of utility or to create the illusion that sickness and death are unreal.

To repeat therefore, direct action to bring on death in the situation described here may be moral. The absolutist stance opposed to this conclusion must assume the burden of proof—an impossible burden, I believe.

Finally, to self-killing in a non-medical context. It is estimated that more than eighty Americans a day kill themselves. Jacques Choron calculates that between six and seven million living Americans have attempted suicide and that 25 percent of these will try again and many will succeed. From a moral viewpoint it may be said that an enormous majority of these cases represent unmitigated tragedy. Most suicides flow from a loss of the vital ingredients of human life, hope and a supportive loving community. Studies show the suicide as a lonely, desperate person. His act is *The Cry for Help*, the title of a book on attempted suicide by Farberow and Schneidman. Eighty percent of all suicides signal their intentions in advance, apparently by way of final, desperate pleading. Contrary to the rationalizing myth, most suicides are not psychotic. Alcoholism and drug use are, of course, not unrelated to the suicidal syndrome.

The incidence of suicide in certain groups is revealing.

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Suicide rates among blacks and Indians in this nation are rated as of epidemic proportions. Two to three times more women than men attempt suicide. Suicide increases in socially disorganized communities and the rate of successful suicide among divorced persons is remarkably high. There can be no doubt that most suicides are an indictment of the surviving community which failed to give the possibility of life to their suicidal victims.

The prime moral reaction to suicide should be to attack the causes that yield such bitter fruit. Those of Christian persuasion should be in the forefront here. For Christians, the loss of hope is apostasy and to contribute to the loss of hope in others is the elementary Christian sin. Dietrich Bonhoeffer judged suicide severely from the perspective of Christian faith: "It is because there is a living God that suicide is wrongful as a sin of lack of faith." He did, however, realize that suicide is not univocal. Though usually akin to murder, "it would be very short-sighted simply to equate every form of self-killing with murder." Some suicides could be highly motivated and Bonhoeffer was inclined to suspend judgment with regard to these because "here we have reached the limits of human knowledge." Unless we do ethics by taboo, however, we must do more than suspend judgment. We must also discuss the possibility of objectively moral suicide. The discussion here relies on the points argued in the preceding cases.

Some moralists have not suspended favorable judgment on all suicides. Some medievals, weighing the suicides of such as Samson and virgin saints who killed themselves to avoid violation, concluded that the Holy Spirit had inspired their actions. (This, of course, implied the unraised question of whether the Holy Spirit could inspire other suicides.) Henry Davis, in his *Moral and Pastoral Theology*, leaned on the abused distinction between direct and indirect and concluded that a sexually threatened maiden

> "may leap from a great height to certain death, for her act has two effects, the first of which is to escape from violation, the second, her death, which is not directly wished but only permitted. The distinction between the jump and the fall is obvious. In the case, the maid wishes the jump and puts up with the fall."

Davis' distinction is not obvious to today's moralists who would find the maiden's ability to dissect her intentionality even more remarkable than her passion for material chastity.

Some modern moralists have defended the suicide of a spy who, when captured, could be induced by chemicals or by torture to reveal damaging data. Less attended to are the social witness type suicides related, for example, to the early phase of the Vietnam war. In assessing the objective morality of the suicide of Roger LaPorte which first signaled to many in Communist China and Indochina the depth of anti-war feeling in America, our judgment should *at the least* show the kind of reserve that Bonhoeffer brings to limit situations. Of the possibility of other moral suicides it must be said that there are strong presumptions against them, arising from the experience of grounded hope, from the number of alternatives open to imaginative man and from the effects on the bereaved. However, no one is wise enough to say that those presumptions could not be overridden unless, of course, that someone is privy to knowledge of all possible circumstances. Realistic ethics requires more modesty than that. Thus, the possibility of objectively moral self-killing is an open question, and it may not be excluded that direct self-killing may be a good moral action, in spite of the strong presumptions against it.

In sum, then, death has lost its medical and moral simplicity. We know it now as a process, not a moment, and we have the means to extend or shorten that process. In the older ethics of dying, begged questions reigned unchallenged. The ordinary/extraordinary means rubric is still useful, but not self-sufficient. The borders between ordinary and extraordinary blur and shift, and years ago moralist Gerald Kelly, S.J., pointed out that even ordinary means are not always obligatory. The contention that life could be terminated indirectly and by omission but never directly by commission, was not proved—and that is a serious omission.

As Stanford law school Dean, Bayless Manning, has said: "The topic as a whole is still subterranean, and decisions are predominantly being made by thousands of doctors in millions of different situations and by undefined, particularized, *ad hoc* criteria." One partial solution to this would be a happily financed, well managed, hard-working, yearly study-meeting which would bring together doctors, lawyers, moralists of every stripe, insurance experts, nurses, social workers, morticians, sociologists, gravely ill persons, clergymen, journalists, etc., to discuss the current state of dying. The results each year should be energetically publicized in learned journals and in all news media, since death education is needed at every level. (Perhaps some mortal and affluent readers will let their treasures be where their hearts are in this regard.)

Hopefully, a healthier attitude toward death will emerge in our culture. We all could learn from a Donegal Irishman whose death a few years ago was a testimonial to culture wisdom. While on his deathbed, he was visited by friends who knew, as did he, that this would be their final visit. The dying man ordered his son to bring whisky for the guests. With this done, the son asked his father if he, too, would indulge. "Oh, no," replied the father with a gentle frown, "I don't want to be meeting the Lord with the smell of the drink on my breath." A few hours later, he died. If we were as at home with death as he, our deliberations on the subject might be more wise.

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CRACKS IN THE BURGER COURT

ISIDORE SILVER

There were some interesting variations in the last session, which may augur for a muting—though not a dissolution—of the conservative majority's stance

Under Chief Justice Burger's less than inspired leadership, the Supreme Court has become personally, as well as politically, fractured. Although Burger and the other three Nixon appointees voted together in (an amazing) 82 percent of the cases decided this year, even that apparently monolithic alignment may suffer under the pressures of novel cases and Burger's ham-handed stewardship. The 1971-2 term of the Court was predominantly conservative and the majority inclined toward endorsement—rather than criticism—of anti-libertarian activities of other branches of government. In a fundamental sense, the Court returned to its pre-Earl Warren role of being the most socially and politically uninnovative governmental institution. However, there were some interesting variations, variations which may augur for a muting—though not a dissolution—of the seemingly implacable stance of the Burger (plus three)-White conservative majority.

No such variation, alas, can be gleaned from the majority's consistent refusal to protect and expand the First Amendment. On the last day of the term, the Court refused to apply that venerable provision to (a) newsmen and the confidentiality of their sources and (b) congressmen as gatherers and disseminators of properly public information (albeit information classified by the executive as secret). Earlier, the same majority denied the existence of a Constitutional right to distribute handbills in a privately owned, publicly frequented, shopping mall. Although numerous rulings of the Court this past year either watered down or rejected the heady criminal procedure precedents of the Warren Court, a dispassionate analysis of the cases and their importance indicates that the First, rather than any other, Amendment was the chief victim of the onslaught.

The Court's acquiescence to other branches of government was most clearly evident in the *Tatum* decision, which denied "standing" to certain political activists to challenge legally the Army's (by now largely abandoned) program of civilian surveillance and in the holding in *Flood v Kuhn* that Congress, and not the Court, should include baseball as a "business" subject to the anti-trust laws—despite the fact that, as even the majority noted, the exemption for that one sport was Court- and not Congressionally- created in 1922.

A few well publicized "liberal" "landmark" decisions should not unduly mislead us into believing that the Court has not decisively changed. Although capital punishment has apparently been outlawed for now, that meandering, confusing decision—wherein each Justice wrote his own opinion—was based more upon Justices Stewart's and White's disinclination to send more than 600 men to their deaths than to any reasonably clear interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" provision (cf. my piece in the February 18 *Commonweal.*)

The unanimous decision that the President was not Constitutionally authorized to wiretap domestic radicals without court order was both complex and deceptive: to countenance this outrageous claim would have invoked a judicial capitulation drastically curbing its *own* powers and would have seriously eroded the Fourth Amendment, historically a particularly sensitive right both to Supreme Court Justices, liberal and conservative, and to American Society. Justice Powell, despite the vigor of his denunciatory language, nevertheless clearly invited Congress to legislate on the subject and clearly implied that loose wiretap standards (even looser than those flimsy ones now ordained by federal law) would be appropriate since the nature of the "intelligence" to be gathered in "subversive" surveillance significantly differs from the "hard evidence" involved in oversight of traditional criminal activities.

A careful reading of the *Yoder* decision which allowed Amish schoolchildren to be exempted from Wisconsin's compulsory attendance laws—or, at least, from the last two years thereof—is also replete with a tantalizing ambiguity. Justice Burger's opinion is shot through with Agnewesque references to the rights of ("law-abiding") families to determine the religious upbringing of children and is disdainful of both the children's rights and the role of public education in America. His derisive comments about the "conformity" and "competitiveness" fostered by the system startlingly contradicts Earl Warren's classic enunciation of the "socialization" function of public education in the *Brown* case 18 years ago.

Despite the personal and ideological divisions, there are some hopeful signs. Potter Stewart, still a comparatively young man, has been pushed to the "left" on

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First Amendment issues, although he remains a conservative on most criminal justice questions. White, following his own Constitutional star, although more conservative on free speech, continues to gyrate wildly on criminal issues. The most interesting Justices, by far, are Powell and Blackmun, and their few, but nonetheless startling, deviations from the "Burger line" may portend future splits (both are more intelligent men and better judges than their chief). Powell has taken up the mantle of the late Justice Harlan and promises to develop as an independent thinker as drastically as did the latter, on at least some critical issues. Although an inveterate exponent of "property rights," Powell has shown some flexibility on other issues; for instance, he provided a bridge between the Burger nucleus and the embattled liberals in two major cases, those involving the requirement of unanimity in jury trials and the newsman's privilege. In the first, he bewilderingly found that the Sixth Amendment required unanimity in federal trials, but not in state criminal proceedings, a thoroughly Harlanian approach. Thus, he saved the liberals on the narrow issue while giving the ultimate decision to the conservatives on the larger one. White, for the majority, argued that the Sixth Amendment did apply to state proceedings, an argument echoed by the liberal dissenters, but that the Founding Fathers hadn't meant to incorporate the principle of "unanimity" into it (the term is unmentioned in the Bill of Rights); the liberals—and most of us—were shocked since they regarded American history, if nothing else, as providing ample evidence to support the principle. Powell, in an analysis with which no one else agreed, split the difference. On the second issue, Powell concurred with the majority but said that, under some vague and ill-defined circumstances, newsmen could protect themselves and their sources from governmental (*i.e.* grand jury) harassment.

Blackmun, who has been heavily criticized by scholars for his acquiescence to Burger, vigorously (for him) dissented in a case denying the Sierra Club standing to sue to prevent the Mineral King project and is rumored to be "liberal" on the abortion cases before the Court. Indeed, he had reportedly drafted a majority opinion holding that state anti-abortion laws unconstitutionally invaded a woman's right to privacy, but then allowed Burger to "hold up" the decision on the grounds that Powell and Rehnquist, the new Justices had not participated in the arguments on the case (the matter will be heard again this October). Next year should tell more about this enigmatic and disappointing man. One fears that he will become the Felix Frankfurter of the Burger Court, agonizing over and protesting against bad laws, but severely limiting his role in striking them down.

The continuing turmoil of American Society, reflected in the Democratic convention and the halls of Congress, will doubtlessly continue to split the Supreme Court. Burger's *dixit* ("It is because I say it is") will continue to confound those who vainly believe that the divisions of a "polarized" society should not be reflected in a "legal" institution. Another "polarized" generation—on the issue of slavery in the 1850's—learned that "law" (in the *Dred Scott* case) could not solve its problems, just as we must learn that the Court cannot be insulated from the life around it. For those of us who prefer Earl Warren's *dixits* to those of the current Chief Justice, our main (and, perhaps, only) hope lies in an increasing independence of thought and sensitivity by Justices such as Powell and Blackmun. That hope may be forlorn and would certainly be doomed if the American people, this November, return the incumbent to the White House. Nixon would then have another four years (and perhaps two Court appointments) to make our society and its Bill of Rights less than they could be.

THE HITCHCOCK *TOUCHE*

THE SCREEN

If not a film made with the classic Hitchcock touch, *Frenzy* is at least a film displaying some touches of the old Hitchcock. The plot, which concerns a man unjustly accused of strangling women with his necktie, is weakened by inconsistencies and improbabilities. But every third or fourth scene we're treated to a moment of pure Hitchcockiness. (What else could you call the technique of a man who signs his films with a trademark personal appearance at the beginning, before even letting us see what he's made. Even the greatest painters wait until the bottom of the canvas before signing their work.) Consider one of the scenes in which a murder is discovered.

We have seen the woman murdered in her office and know that her body awaits discovery by her secretary returning from lunch. The secretary enters the building with Hitchcock's camera following along behind her in the street. She has only to climb a flight of stairs to the office. But the camera has stopped at the street door as she disappears into the building. Staring down the deserted street, we wait for her scream . . . and wait and wait. The tension mounts. Suddenly, two women we've never seen before, and who have no bearing on the plot, happen to walk around the corner engrossed in inconsequential conversation. Our suspense deflates through the hole that this unexpected irrelevancy has poked in our concentration. *Then* we hear the secretary's scream.

Surprise let-downs of this sort have been a Hitchcock speciality. He's always liked to amuse us just when we thought we were going to be horrified instead—to divert suddenly expectations that his own direction has built up in us with great care. In a later scene, when a verdict for two of these necktie murders is about to be an-

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nounced at the trial of the fellow we know to be innocent, a courtroom door swings shut and cuts off the sound of the jury foreman's voice. Hitchcock has stationed both his camera and his mike in the corridor outside the courtroom; and so, when the door swings shut just as we were hoping to find out the fate of the accused, we must stare helplessly through the glass, ignorant of what's being said. But the very moment we give up trying to interpret the pantomime we can see inside, a curious bailiff pushes the door open a crack, and we hear the judge discussing sentence in a tone that at once tells us what the verdict was.

Hitchcock has worked here in much the same way that he did earlier when the murder was discovered. His film has many such moments. By keeping from us what we want to know, he makes us take the greater interest in how we shall find it out. The style of the story becomes its subject. That's the art of the thing. Murder and mayhem are only the ostensible subjects of a Hitchcock film: what really occupies and entertains us is the manner in which Hitchcock deals with such material.

In a sense this whole film is a disarming and good-natured attempt to disappoint our expectations. *Frenzy* fits into Hitchcock's late career the way that one of these scenes I've been discussing fits into the film itself. This film at first seems to have been made in the tradition of *Psycho*. But because *Psycho* opened up the market for the sex-and-violence thrillers now all too plentiful, Hitchcock may be a bit sorry he made that film. A murder as explicit as that first one in *Psycho* is uncharacteristic of Hitchcock's earlier, better work; and despite having made *Psycho,* Hitchcock has consistently disapproved of the nudity and brutality to which his own daring has led. In an article published in the *New York Times* a few years ago, he said he still much prefers to direct our attention elsewhere while murders are committed and seductions consummated unseen. Yet *Frenzy* seemed to promise it would be Hitchcock's own attempt to go beyond *Psycho*. Its publicity—some of which Hitchcock himself participated in—guaranteed nudity as well as a psychopathic killer.

But Hitchcock's real motives in making the film have been the opposite of what this lurid appeal suggests. The expectation he would deflate in us this time is the lascivious one that brings audiences to a film with a title like *Frenzy*. He has cast very plain, unprovocative women in all the female roles and has gone out of his way to deprive us of any prurient interest in them. When the best-looking of the lot slips out of bed in one scene, Hitchcocks leaves the camera on her naked body. But to fend off a chill English night she immediately puts on her boyfriend's socks. No woman can be alluring in a pair of argyle socks.

The same desire to chide and reform us is apparent in Hitchcock's treatment of the first of the two key murders in the film. Hitchcock shows us the entire murder, but again denies us any kinky thrill. The victim is too pathetic: a modest, Christian woman wearing a little gold cross around her throat, mumbling a passage from the Bible and trying awkwardly to stuff her bosom back into her bra as the murderer hovers over her. Having given us a distaste for this sort of thing, Hitchcock then shows us with a second murder how such a scene is done properly.

This time the camera accompanies the victim only as far as the murderer's flat, pausing in the hall outside his door as it did in the street when we were waiting for the first woman's body to be discovered. Then the camera begins to backtrack, backing silently down the stairs and out of the hall right into the street. The sounds of the street come up as the camera emerges from the building and people pass before the retreating lens. The camera's gradual revelation of all these ordinary people in the street going about their ordinary business makes all the more menacing what we know will happen upstairs behind drawn curtains.

On account of this contrast, the second murder is really the more chilling and graphic of the two. Like the new murder, the murderer is always hidden behind a facade of normal appearances and everyday activity. The crime now reflects perfectly the personality of the criminal. It is direction like that in the second murder scene that gives *Frenzy* its true touches of Hitchcock. Such moments are at least small reminders that something besides brute sex and violence can still please us. It always gives one a lift to be reminded that artistry can compensate him for a disappointment to his libido.

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

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BIRON WALKER

MISGIVINGS

For twenty years I've sat in this desk seat
and spelled my eyes by looking out the window
onto early summer's vital height,
into a wealth that washes a green glow
on shade itself. Close by, the basket-oak
unfurls its leaves as broad as fans. No noon heat
tarnishes their high wet gloss. Their thick
ribbed tissue neither shrinks nor wilts from it.

The flanking hickory and ironwood
compete, flaunting rival fitnesses
of bole, foliage, bloom.

Yet I have observed
each time that, with the stir of any breeze,
shaken loose from some inner unseen
arboring a few pale leaves drift down.

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TACTILE POLITICS

THOMAS F. HEFFERNAN

In its day, Agrarianism generated much excitement, and not just in the South

THIS is the forty-first anniversary of a social document which had the impact of a manifesto in its time. When remembered today, *I'll Take My Stand* is often enough seen as a quaint relic of the days when the South which had gotten used to being post-bellum had to get used to being post-depression and was contending, as some Southerners saw it, with industrialism as with a second Reconstruction.

I'll Take My Stand was the fundamental statement of Southern Agrarianism and appeared under the authorship of "Twelve Southerners," the best remembered of whom—Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, Robert Penn Warren, John Gould Fletcher and Stark Young—are or were men of letters.

The book was, in economic terms, a defense of subsistence farming against mushrooming industrialism and a commercial establishment thriving on gratuitous consumption. It was also, in cultural terms, a defense of the values and habits of a society "in which agriculture is the leading vocation, . . . the model to which the other forms approach as well as they may," values and habits which included tradition, piety, leisure, "a free and disinterested observation of nature," and the social sensibilities expressed in "manners, conversation, hospitality, sympathy, family life, romantic love."

The book and the Agrarian movement grew partly out of *The Fugitive*, a magazine of poetry which Tate, Ransom, Warren, Donald Davidson and twelve other editors published in Nashville from 1922 to 1925. The four editors named passed over into Agrarianism in the late twenties, reversing a critical posture they had tentatively adopted in *The Fugitive*. In the first issue of the magazine they had announced that they fled "from nothing faster than from the high-caste Brahmins of the Old South," but a number of influences over the years led them to an intense identification with the South. The Scopes trial clinched it; what Tate and his colleagues regarded as the descent of the barbarian journalists on Dayton, Tennessee, and the irreverent and all-inclusive satire of the South which they produced rallied the four Fugitives to defend what they had felt free to criticize before.

Today Agrarianism is not a living issue outside of some circles like *The Georgia Review* and the University of Dallas, but in its day it generated a good deal of excitement, and not just in the South. *I'll Take My Stand* makes it clear that its authors are concerned about the South above all, but would welcome the spread of their economic theory through other regions of the country. At the height of interest in Agrarianism the issue was ventilated almost as much in popular journals like *The New Republic* as in Southern magazines, and its defense was couched in strictly economic and sociological terms, not appeals to special regional interest.

The movement has been regarded as extremely conservative, and the label was not repugnant to Agrarians (as the label of fascist was), but it is a distinctive form of American conservatism by virtue of its fundamental anti-capitalism. Capitalism and Communism, from the Agrarian point of view, are fraternal forms of collectivism, and the real and immediate threat was posed by capitalism. Explaining in *The New Republic* in 1936 why he was voting for Roosevelt's second term (because Roosevelt was against privilege and Big Business), Tate ended by saying that if he were a Communist he would vote for Landon. "Capitalism and Socialism are simply different names for an attack on the institution of property." The key word is property.

What moved the Agrarians? Although all the contributors to *I'll Take My Stand* subscribed to a common preface which spelled out their soil-centered economy, they were not speaking as mere advocates of economic theory. Outrage over the insulted South was a motive; so was desire to restore a violated sanctuary of refinement. Of all the Agrarians Allen Tate expressed their motives most perceptively.

Allen Tate was the most brilliant of the Agrarians and his defense of the movement most instructive. He represents his own attraction to Agrarianism in terms which are more illuminating than he may have realized. The basis of all his political thought is the sense of touch.

The root offense of capitalism has been the abstraction of wealth from property, Tate explains repeatedly. This means that men do not have active control over the source of their wealth, or, more to the point, they cannot handle it themselves. "The people must be shown the fundamental difference between private property, which means effective control by the owner, and corporate property, which usually means control by a clique of many owners." Corporate ownership is not only non-sensual, it is irresponsible and unresponsive. If you were defending your farm, Tate points out in an *American Review* article, you could stand in front of it and shoot at something, but in the world of corporate ownership, there is nothing to shoot at or even to shoot in front of. Ownership is not any longer an extension of the owner's personality, an expression in a tangible product of his own mind and imagination. Wealth separated from property

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is fluid, characterless, unlocalized and anonymous. The owner of corporate wealth is left with merely a symbol of his ownership.

It makes no difference how much wealth comes to an individual through corporate ownership: with great wealth one becomes not an owner but a consumer, and even when one's tastes are fine one can only surround oneself with the purchased artifacts of a cultural tradition which ceased to be living, ceased to be a tradition, once its elements were turned into ornaments, once they were purchased. The free handing down of a spiritual or material heritage can be called tradition only when it is still alive. The image of the living hand reaching out to another living hand is central to Tate's conception of tradition.

Tate excoriates the Middle Class, "that class which, producing nothing, buys cheap and sells dear, getting a rake-off from both producer and consumer; the Morgans, for example being middle-class, regardless of their wealth and power." But it is important to realize that the real moral indictment of this class is not that they get money without working for it (what one might call the morality of jealousy) nor is it the trite charge of bourgeois vulgarity. The essence of their offense, if Tate were a Dante assigning them to their proper level in hell, would have to be stated as loss of a tactile relationship with the material world. "The Middle Class achieves its purpose by building great cities, in which the rootless intellect thrives." Tate is actually not too far removed from Dante in calibrating his evils: just as for Dante a sin was graver the more that mind figured in it, so for Tate a social order is more corrupt the less that body figures in it.

A reiterated example of this in Tate's early work is the thinking of Northern politicians and crusaders prior to the Civil War. In his biography of Jefferson Davis, and in his biography of Stonewall Jackson, Tate repeatedly blames the Northern authorities for their abstract interpretation of the Constitution —and of the will of God—without any total sensual impression of what they were dealing with. "Lack of historical imagination," Tate says, "is a constitutional weakness of the liberal point of view." It is contact with concrete reality that would have saved the North from the abstraction of morality in those days as it will save the South from the abstraction of money in the 1930's. The Southerner had a concrete view of his culture and a concrete view of history (history is a noun of agency, says Tate, not a process).

Tate condemns all morality that comes from the mind, whether it be the female missionary zeal of the abolitionist or the "process of moral reasoning" which John Adams proposed to Thomas Jefferson as a rule of conduct; Jefferson (who is in this instance, but not always, one of Tate's spokesmen for the South) proposed "taste" to Adams as his rule, for taste combined honorable instance with manners and breeding, and was therefore sounder than Adams' cerebral criterion.

Tate's colleague, John Crowe Ransom, had a "horror of abstraction" in poetry; Tate had it in politics. In a 1933 article, "Poetry and Politics," Tate takes the thirteenth-century poet-king, Thibaut de Champagne, on a tour of the American literary scene. "No one can fail to understand the New England poets," Tate observes, "not even Thibaut. But we must tell him that what happened in their minds formerly, when he was alive, took place in the world of sense." By the double sin of Protestantism and capitalism New Englanders have denied their senses and their instincts and moved their lives into their minds.

This denial bodes ill for passion, the passion which Tate's novel, *The Fathers,* shows as lurking behind all sound reason. A central figure in *The Fathers* is deracinated and violent and lost because he lives from the mind; after the climax of his tragedy it is said of him that he "could feel only himself," that is, that he lacks the saving contact, sensual contact, with his environment and tradition. There are other violent men in the novel, but none whose violence is the product of this same loss of touch. In "The Immortal Woman" Tate offers this use of touch as a comment on the emotional life: "I have never believed that anger has anything in it that one can touch and see;" says one of the characters, "it is different from love which is always physical and so knows where to stop, at the end of familiar things."

Passion, like the *thymos* in Plato's *Republic,* has to be part of an integrated morality as surely as right reason and right imagination do. The effective moral pedagogue in Tate's Republic is tradition, living and sensually present. What Tate says of the *Waste Land* he could be saying of his own *The Fathers*: ". . . in ages which suffer the decay of manners, religion, morals, codes, our indestructible vitality demands expression in violence and chaos; it means that men who have lost both the higher myth of religion and the lower myth of historical dramatization have lost the forms of human action."

Tate the poet knew that his conservatism was a protection of a world which he wanted to be able to comprehend sensually: he would have the world about which he was informed coextensive with the world he saw. Property. When one owns a farm it is in the mind and the eye at once; when one owns stocks that is not the case. When one is paid for woodworking, one is paid for what mind, eyes and hands have been defining. Great peace of mind for the individual and great stability for a society flow from such integration and definition.

While not every contributor to *I'll Take My Stand* was capable of reducing his motivation to the tactile need found in Tate, it still seems that that need more than any other political or psychological motive lay behind Agrarianism. The Agrarians have been called Arcadians or defeated romantics and in two notable controversies they have been called fascists. These characterizations are not adequate or, in the case of fascism, really accurate. Agrarianism is a quest for the reassurance offered to the disturbed and alienated clinical patient

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to convince him that the physical world is still there. The patient is made to touch the wet and the dry, the smooth and the rough, the brittle and the flexible and to build upon these concrete experiences, trust in all experiences and to identify himself as an unthreatened participant in them. The Agrarians offered this therapy to a whole society.

No one can argue that the world is not becoming more abstract (or spiritualized); the Agrarian and Teilhard would be at one on the phenomenon. Abstraction, which in earlier ages was a matter of thought and the province of philosophers, is now a matter of daily life and a habit of everyone. Communications, contracts, commerce, computers, ease of travel and popular proliferation of recondite conclusions make life more abstract.

Agrarianism was in its day a defensive action against this abstraction. Just how realistic it was then and how realistic it ever could be is easier to see with the passage of time. Tate complained repeatedly about the economic determinism which taught that the world had to go the way it was going, in particular that industrialism had to develop the way it was developing. That is fair enough, but in the long run the Agrarians attacked not economic determinism but the determinism which through the green fuse drives the flower.

To alter or constrain any particular form of economic development is conceivable, but to constrain development itself is not. Carried to its logical caricature Agrarianism was a movement aimed not at containing abuses but at making the race forget a good deal of what it knew: to forget that it could communicate more easily, to forget that it could reduce physical labor and to forget that its power, opportunities and security could be enhanced by means which, alas, must be called abstract.

Our own time has seen in the sensitivity session a turning toward physical sensation as the foundation of a more human life. The problem of being physical in an increasingly unphysical world is one which we have just begun to perceive the seriousness of. There was something prophetic in the instincts of the Agrarians. Where Agrarianism doomed itself, however, was in its becoming more closed the more it became sensual. Encounter groups use sensation to open their members to each other. But the Agrarian closed himself because the object of his sensation was property, "my own," which he saw as an extension of his personality. The recurrent images in Agrarian writing of "keep," "hold," "possess," show that sensation has gone terribly awry and anal.

Agrarianism is not the only form of conservatism which is marked by property fixation and the attendant machinery of threat, but it is one of the most rationalized. As a historical lesson it is still relevant forty-one years later.

BOOKS

The making of the populist

A Populist Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority

JACK NEWFIELD & JEFF GREENFIELD

Praeger, $5.95

Will the Revolution Succeed? Rebirth of the Radical Democrat

EDWARD SCHWARTZ

Criterion, $5.95

DENNIS HALE

America is like a man who has a recurrent nightmare. Every generation or so, it occurs to us that something is terribly wrong with this country, something so bad that we wonder how it went unnoticed for so long. What is it? Poverty? War? Racism? Just a while ago we believed that things were working themselves out pretty well: back in 1960, for example, it was common understanding that America was in great shape, except for racial discrimination. Fairly high employment, lots of people going to college, Social Security, big hospitals, food surpluses: everything worked. We'd just wipe those silly race laws off the books and everyone would be happy.

Then gradually it became clear that there was going to be more to it than that. One by one the angry movements came: Black Power, kids, women, conservationists, gays, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, Indians, farmers, white ethnics. By a process of elimination, America was judged to be an almost irretrievable mess. The nightmare is back: what once seemed a fairly simple problem in "social engineering" now seems impossible.

These two books argue convincingly that it has always been that way, that between the nightmares we have never been fully awake. *The Populist Manifesto* calls us back to the days of the People's party, when, not for the first time, a powerful working class movement threatened to turn the country around. *Will the Revolution Succeed?* takes a longer look at history, and shows that at regular intervals broadly based movements concerned with social and economic equality grew to major proportions, only to see defeat at the hands of Federalists, Whigs, robber barons, and liberals, leaving virtually no impact on our collective consciousness, and scarcely a record in our history texts.

A Populist Manifesto was written, as the authors admit, for a movement that does not yet exist. Over the past year references to the "new populism" have appeared here and there in the liberal press, and this book is an attempt to focus that interest and attach it to a

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specific program. Its basic theme is that everybody but the "fat cats" has an interest in radical reform. There then appears one of those improbable lists we see so many of these days: assembly-line workers, Polish-American homeowners, Italian grocers, old people, youth, blacks, Chicanos, women, concerned professionals, migrant workers, etc. These are the "people" that the new "people's" movement" will speak to and for. That they are not yet self-consciously a people is a problem that Newfield and Greenfield are aware of, but to which they offer no new solutions.

What they offer instead is a quick summary of America's social and economic problems, and specific proposals for solving them. They advocate free health care for all, a tax code that is truly progressive, controls on corporations and the way they do business, community access to the media, gun control, court and prison reform, community participation in police work, stricter federal control of banks and insurance companies, land reform, and the like. It is a good summary, especially of the trickier problems such as insurance practices, banking laws, and the tax code. Most of these proposals have been kicking around for many years; some of them are not even "radical" in the current sense of the word. But it is hard to imagine any of them becoming law, which is why this is ultimately a very frustrating book.

It is not that the authors are unaware of the problem. As they say, "It is critical . . . to separate what we *want* to happen from what we *think* will happen politically. . . . The willingness to make the wish father to the thought seems to grip most discussions of coming social change." But their "people's movement" remains just that, a wish, and the question we could all spend some time trying to answer is why that is so.

The conventional political wisdom says that Americans vote their pocketbooks. Thus, appeals to economic self-interest always seem hard-headed (what a strange compliment!) and practical, and when the Left manages to produce a criticism of itself the line is usually that it has failed to make an appeal to the economic interests of the working and middle-class voter. There is now even a school of tough-guy unsentimental journalism (Pete Hamill, Jimmy Breslin, and Jack Newfield are members of it) that is making a worthy but probably futile effort to radicalize the Archie Bunkers of the world by talking about tax loopholes and other free rides for the rich. Some samples of this approach are Breslin's endorsement on the cover *The Populist Manifesto* ("All my life I've heard the people I grew up with in Queens say, 'The big shots, the fancy rich guys, are screwing us.' Finally, this book tells them—and me—who they are and what we can do about it. Brilliant!") and a typical indictment from the book itself ("The sons of Harvard and Yale sent the sons of Watts and South Boston to die in Vietnam.").

Worthy, yes, but so damned unreal, like those crazy lists of revolutionaries that exclude only white male middle-class corporation executives who have not contributed to Common Cause. The truth is that voters care about economic issues *some* of the time, and vote their pocketbooks when the issues are presented to them in those terms (higher vs. lower food prices, higher vs. lower taxes). The rest of the time they can vote for the most "sentimental" of reasons (ethnicity and religion) or in ways that seem completely irrational. If there is a revolt among the working middle class (among white ethnics, for example), it is probably as much because their lives have been mocked for so long, as because their taxes have been too high. The Wallace vote, which has provoked some truly incredible speculations in the mass media, is a good example. People vote for Wallace for one or both of two reasons, and neither has anything to do with economic interests: a) because he is a racist, or b) because he is a "little guy" talking back to the "big guys." Wallace voters care not whether their man had a decent tax program as governor (he didn't), whether he has ever accepted campaign contributions from those same "big guys" (he has), or whether he has ever demonstrated any real concern for the economic problems of the working man (if he has, no evidence remains on the statute books in Alabama). He is saying what others feel, he is afraid of the same things they are afraid of, and to hell with whether there is any money in it.

Just before the Second World War, George Orwell caused a stir in England by arguing that British Socialists were driving the British people to Fascism. "Probably it is very easy," he wrote in *The Road to Wigan Pier*, "when you have had a bellyful of the more tactless kind of Socialist propaganda, to see Fascism as the last line defence of all that is good in European civilization. . . . Socialists have . . . never made it sufficiently clear that the essential aims of Socialism are justice and liberty. With their eyes glued to economic facts, they have proceeded on the assumption that man has no soul, and explicitly or implicitly they have set up the goal of a materialistic Utopia. As a result Fascism has been able to play upon every instinct that revolts against hedonism and a cheap conception of progress."

Any political appeal which fails to understand this will never be more than a legislative program; that is the most serious weakness of *The Populist Manifesto*, and, indeed, of most of the "new populism" literature. The old Populists had an economic program: true. But they had something much more important: a vision of how citizens could overcome their many differences in the process of changing their common destinies. Populists were not asked simply to vote for free silver and government ownership of the railroads. They were asked to change themselves, to become new kinds of men and women. People who had never given speeches, who could in many cases barely read, were encouraged to become stump speakers, editorial writers, and candidates for office. And the followers of the movement by no means had identical economic interests: there were many conflicts between middle western and southern farmers, for example, and between farmers and urban workers. But it took a lot more than a sensible

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program to overcome these differences: it took something in the nature of a religious revival.

This is where Ed Schwartz' book makes an invaluable contribution. Schwartz has been involved in many political movements over the past decade, and he wrote this book to figure out why so many of them came to nothing, or worse. In the process, he has gone over the history of previous radical movements, and come to the conclusion that they were most successful when they drew their appeals from the tradition of native democratic radicalism. Although he joins Newfield and Greenfield in calling for a new "populist coalition," he comes much closer to capturing the essence of a populist movement: which is not the accidental fact of its members' common interests, but their common commitment (which is far from accidental) to a particular vision of justice.

This vision has typically had a religious component: in the order of things ordained by God, society gives to each man his due, and the result is a general condition of social and economic equality. No man is worth more than another, and society may not help one put himself above others.

Second, the populist vision of justice has never been welcome in the universe of liberalism. To the extent that liberalism has feared politics—because it is messy, inefficient, and dangerously unsettling—it has shied away from placing strict moral demands on society. Schwartz claims that democratic radicalism has been the victim of a compromise, whereby increased industrial production was traded for an older moral concern about the use and distribution of wealth. Liberalism has argued, especially in the past three decades, that democracy's commitment to equality could not survive in the modern world, but that we needn't concern ourselves about this because an industrial economy would eventually render equality unnecessary. Everyone would have enough to eat, and more: consumer goods would be so readily available that the difference in income between a corporation executive and a steelworker would in practice work no hardships. "Share the wealth" schemes would be headed off by the "trickle-down" theory, and in a comic representation of that notion, Richard Nixon went to Moscow to debate the leader of world communism in a model American kitchen.

But perhaps the most welcome idea in this book is the very simple one that if people are to become other than what they are, they must have some way of imagining other, post-revolutionary selves that encompass more than their economic relations. "We are victims of our own tawdry images of man," Schwartz says. A society based solely on the pursuit of a larger Gross National Product has run out of models. Given the tawdriness of the nation's goals, its citizens cannot be anything better than what they are. Or, to be more accurate, they cannot be freer than they are. The potential is there. The vision is not.

Schwartz believes that the vision cannot be found within the assumptions of industrial society, and that without a challenge to the fundamental direction of America's development, the possibility of movement will exist only at the periphery, among minorities and outcasts. "People everywhere . . . are fed up with the false gods of the twentieth century. . . . They long for a new reason to pursue the perfections they can imagine. . . . [But] a movement must offer dignity to those who participate in it, not merely in generations yet unborn. People must sense the nobility of the battle itself."

That, at least, is a hopeful beginning.

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

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Cold War and Counter-revolution

RICHARD J. WALTON

Viking, $7.95

The Kennedy Doctrine

LOUISE FITZSIMONS

Random House, $7.95

STANLEY HOFFMAN

It had to happen. For several years now, the standard American interpretation of the cold war—that it was Washington's brave and imaginative response to a worldwide push for power conceived and led by Moscow as soon as World War Two was over—has been under attack. A foaming wave of revisionist history has tried to prove, at the least, that American statesmen misperceived Soviet intentions and interpreted a rather prudent, if sometimes brutal, policy based on security fears as a global, aggressive, ideological conspiracy; or, at most, that the United States itself embarked upon a course of imperial expansion dictated by its capitalist economy, designed by its corporate elite, and disguised as an anti-Communist crusade.

Most of these books have concentrated on the origins of the cold war and on the Truman years. Two new volumes extend the counter-offensive to the Kennedy Administration. Both were written by low-ranking public servants. Richard Walton was the UN correspondent of the Voice of America in the Kennedy years. Louise Fitzsimons has been on the staff of the Atomic Energy Commission. Their books are almost identical. Both try to show that Kennedy was, as Mr. Walton puts it, "an entirely conventional cold warrior." Both denounce the huge military buildup he decreed after his election campaign in which he had warned of a missile gap that turned out to have been imaginary. Both denounce the Bay of Pigs and describe its messy mélange of brashness and clumsiness, of arrogance and naiveté. Both are highly critical of two episodes which Kennedy supporters usually list among his triumphs—his handling of the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis. Both see him as having deliberately turned into confrontations that took the world to the brink of the nuclear abyss, Soviet moves defensive in character and aimed at (or easily manageable by) traditional diplomatic bargaining. Mr. Walton gives numerous examples of the anti-Communist rhetoric in which Kennedy indulged, which saw in any Communist government anywhere a threat to America's security, and which, according to him, smacked of a kind of crude *machismo* both personal and national. Miss Fitzsimons denounces the counterinsurgency fad of the Kennedy years. Both use the Pentagon Papers to show how Kennedy deepened and broadened America's involvement in Indochina. Both give him some credit for his African policies and for the speech at American University in June 1963, in which Kennedy proposed an entirely new approach to the Soviet Union. However, both volumes are essentially rebuttals of the hagiographies written by many of the President's former aides soon after his assassination.

Readers interested in debunking should be told that Mr. Walton's book is more analytic and provocative, Miss Fitzsimons' more journalistic and diffuse. But neither really sets the record straight. They make valid points—some, like the critique of the Bay of Pigs and of Vietnam, have been made often before; others, such as the attack on the cold war rhetoric of 1961, have been used by the Nixon Administration to show its own moderation, but remain well worth pondering. How far, indeed, we have gone in ten years—and at what cost! However, both volumes suffer from the same two flaws that have marred the new revisionism so far.

First, it is now the Soviet Union which is being given the benefit of every doubt, and whose policy is being interpreted as reasonable or at least not dangerous. This leads to a drastic oversimplification of the record. Did Khrushchev, in Berlin, really want nothing more than a just diplomatic solution of the Berlin problem? Was his notion of fairness fair to the people of the city? What would have been its repercussions on West Germany? Neither book takes into account Kennedy's need to deal, not merely with Khrushchev, but also with Adenauer; both authors handle the Berlin crisis as if only the USSR and the U.S. existed, as if the Western Alliance had been just either a trifle or a liability. As for the "missiles of October," if, as Mr. Walton argues, the Soviet leader only wanted to extract from the United States a commitment not to attack Castro, surely there were less risky ways of getting it. Maybe Kennedy overreacted; but precisely, all his earlier acts and speeches ought to have led Khrushchev to expect such "overreacting"; it was he—not Kennedy—who was tempting fate.

Secondly, both volumes engage in a kind of scapegoating. Both ask: "Who is guilty" for the sins of the cold war, and both point the finger at Kennedy. The interesting question, however, is a much deeper one. Why was there for so long so deep an anti-Communist consensus? Why was the rhetoric of globalism attuned for so long to the mood of American opinion? Why were military "solutions"—weaponry, counter-insurgency, scenarios of limited war or civil defense—the axiomatic responses of American leaders? Wasn't Kennedy's own ambivalence—the hyperbolic toughness of the Inaugural Address and the call for peace and understanding less than two and one half years later—an expression of a national oscillation between the pole of force and the dream of harmony? By looking for sinners and plotters among the leadership or in the Establishment, one whitewashes the public—and one eludes far more embarrassing questions about the roots of American activism, or about America's style in world affairs.

A valid revisionism is necessary—and overdue. But it will have to be more scrupulous in its handling of facts, and far more probing, than anything written up to now. With its disdain for nuances or its double standard applied to American and Soviet

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behavior, with its simple-minded quest for villains, it offers no more than the mirror image of the cold war politics and history it deplores.

The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary

ERNST HAENCHEN

Westminster, $17.50

Jesus

EDUARD SCHWEIZER

John Knox, $7.50

The Formation of The Resurrection Narratives

REGINALD H. FULLER

Macmillan, $3.95 (paper)

Iscariot

BERTIL GARTNER

Fortress Facet Books, $1 (paper)

Was Jesus A Revolutionist?

MARTIN HENGEL

Fortress Facet Books, $1 (paper)

GERARD S. SLOYAN

Professor Haenchen of Münster originally wrote this volume in succession to the work of H. H. Wendt in the *Meyer Commentary* series, his first edition of 1956 being reckoned as the 10th after nine editions of Wendt. The long-awaited English translation is from the 14th German edition of 1965 (there has been another since). R. McL. Wilson has brought the project to completion in splendid idiomatic style. There are intimations in the front matter that, as in the case of Bultmann's *The Gospel of John,* the work of Englishing it has forced several teams of translators and typists into early retirement. Whatever the case, their efforts will prove a service to many. One hundred and thirty pages of Introduction are followed by six hundred of close commentary on 'Luke's' twenty-eight chapters, first by verses within divisions according to sense, then overall with respect to each division.

Haenchen is convinced that the 'Luke' of late second-century attribution cannot have been a companion of Paul since he is unaware of Paul's solution to the problem of the mission to the Gentiles outside the law. 'Luke' takes such a mission for granted. He is under no compulsion to justify it from within, as Paul feels he must do. The Paul of Acts is unfamiliar with basic Pauline theology; moreover he does not make the real claim of Paul to be an Apostle. For 'Luke,' only the Twelve are Apostles. Throughout, Acts draws a picture of relations between Jews and Christians which contradicts that of the Pauline epistles. It has Paul persecuted for preaching an age-old Jewish doctrine, the resurrection of the dead, without any mention of his teaching regarding the law and his corresponding missionary practice, the matters which brought him into conflict with fellow-Jews everywhere. The author of Acts was not, for Haenchen, a participator in the events recorded, not even in the "we" sections, but someone who has utilized written sources. As a historian, Luke "enjoyed a freedom which we today grant only to the historical novel."

Christianity for Luke is a message of salvation promised to Jews and Gentiles equally. Since the Old Testament warned the Jews and promised salvation to the Gentiles, Luke has no problem about the changeover in the makeup of the church. The apostolic decree of Acts 15 is the Apostles' last word from the Jerusalem congregation to the Gentile mission which, in effect, it launched. This historical fact seems to be that Luke has available to him the pattern of Gentile Christian missionary preaching and consistently presents the early Jewish mission in terms of it. He feels himself under the same saving plan of God as the disciples of Galilee, a "mighty arch stretching from Abraham to the Parousia." In Luke's time—he does not call it the period of the church —the gospel spreads triumphantly everywhere. It is not a different kind of time from that of Jesus' earthly career but one foreshadowed by it. Luke does not look for an imminent and sharp turn of the eons as Paul did. He is

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certain that he is living in the eschatological age which Jesus anticipated and he looks for the return of the exalted Lord who, in the present, directs from heaven the life of his people.

Haenchen is judicious in his weighing of evidence and fair to all opposing views. His erudition is great but his style simple. A careful use of this book by preachers and enthusiasts would be of great help in replacing Lucan romanticism regarding early church life with a sober view of the painful Jewish / Jewish-Christian / Gentile-Christian struggles through which Christianity came to birth. It would also heighten respect for this early theological editor of sources rather than diminish it, while dampening enthusiasm for the certainties of Conzelmann, Käsemann and others regarding sharp breaks in the Lucan material between the time of Jesus and the Apostles and the time of the church.

Schweizer does not come through in English so well, probably because of a native density of style. The Zürich professor's *Jesus Christus* of 1968 which *Jesus* translates is in line with the tradition that New Testament scholars either produce a Jesus book before they die or else declare the project impossible. This is a good book for the learned for whom it was not written and not nearly so good (the author calls it an "unpretentious survey") for those for whom it was. Evidently a simpler version existed before the present one. It is certainly more dependable than the single-volume works of Bultmann and Bornkamm, though not nearly so exhilarating to read. The author deals with the failure of Jesus to fit into any formula, including all the late-Jewish titles for one who was expected; with the heavenly Jesus; and with Jesus crucified for the world, all before he turns to a fourfold chapter on "The Earthly Jesus: the Gospel." It is penultimate, the last chapter being an examination of the views of Jesus Christ held by New Testament authors who write with a view to Paul and John (Col., Eph., 1 and 2 Tim., Ti., 1 and 2 Jn.) and those who do not (Heb., Jas., 1 and 2 Pet., Jude). It will be seen from this that the book takes on the full Christological problem. Because of his attention to so many of these questions in previous monographs, Schweizer emerges remarkably well.

He holds that Jesus refused to use any title with an exalted meaning or, indeed, one that would define or delimit. He is inclined to think, however, that "Son of Man" might have come from Jesus and have been joined to the notion of a righteous sufferer after his death, an association that had no previous history in Jewish circles. Especially interesting is Schweizer's contention that in the Christological affirmations of Colossians 1: 15-20 and 2: 14-15, Phillippians 2: 9-10, and 1 Timothy 3: 16, previously existing hymns which viewed Christ as the Lord of the universe were edited so as to keep within bounds the extreme hellenization they represented. Paul and the other authors correct the borrowed hymns and restore the cosmic Lord to his role as head of the eschatological community. The concrete Jesus with his particular characteristics is reaffirmed, lest an exalted figure become increasingly nebulous and "end up as a mere symbol for the universality of the Christian faith."

Schweizer is refreshing for the independent stands he takes on critical questions too long dominated by partisan presuppositions, notably evangelical theology wearing the disguise of critical method.

Professor Fuller's book is the very model of monographs of its kind: an inquiry into the history of the various traditions resulting in the actual gospel material we have. In less than two hundred pages he examines the individual resurrection narratives with immense care—assuming the tradition reported in 1 Corinthians 15: 3-7 to be the first and most dependable one—and takes a stand on how each narrative came into being. For him, the earliest form of the tradition included a visit of Mary Magdalene to the tomb alone, where she discovered the stone rolled away and the tomb empty. The various resurrection appearances reported, while totally real, are not historical but eschatological.

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"On the third day" is not a chronological datum but a dogmatic assertion. "Christ's resurrection marked the dawn of the end-time, the beginning of the cosmic eschatological process of resurrection." It did not take place within historical time, like the crucifixion; both it and the reported appearances took place outside of historical time, in the new age.

Martin Hengel answers the question, Was Jesus a revolutionist? with Yes *and* No. On the basis of a careful sifting of the evidence he finds him no party to violence but one who broke with all parties and powers by his total inner freedom, inviting others to do the same. Hengel finds the case for Jesus as a Zealot weak and as one who demanded armed revolt, fanciful. This rigorous, brief study contains extensive bibliography on the propagandistic use to which Jesus has been put by fascists, Marxists and the Arab "Palestine Front."

Bishop Gärtner of Gothenburg, Sweden, formerly of the Princeton Seminary faculty, follows C. C. Torrey in deriving the surname Iscariot from the Aramaic *'ishqarayā'*, "the false one." He finds many similarities in the gospel tradition on Judas to the rabbinic traditions on Ahithophel. The motif of greed has no great place in the portrayal, whereas inspiration by Satan is much more prominent.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 419)

school pupils. In uncontroverted testimony he stated that Amish young people are not deprived and are free to leave the Amish community if they wish, and the few who have left have had no great difficulty in finding a place in the larger society without a high school education. An education professor from the University of Chicago testified that the Amish receive a vocational education in their community even though they do not go to high school. All of this was to show that the legitimate interests of the state in seeing that its citizens get an education and that they are not cast upon the state, had been satisfied.

I am truly sorry that your article carried the subtitle, "How pure were Catholic motives in support of the Amish school case?" and spoke also of the "confusion over just who was involved in this as [being] responsible for much of the bad press that Catholics have received for their support of the Amish." About the only bad press that Catholics received was an editorial in *Christianity Today* which hadn't bothered to check its own files. I had exchanged several letters explaining these matters with the senior editor. All of the friends of the court were Protestants or Jews. The brickbats for the Amish cases should be thrown at me and the Protestants who spearheaded the Amish victory. The case was not an attack on the public school, nor was it a defense of parochial schools. There was no sinister plot involved. The case concerned only religious liberty and was settled as we intended—to benefit the Amish alone. It concerns whether a state has a right to standardize education in such a way as to have the effect of destroying a church when that church has met basic educational requirements.

We would like to thank the many Catholics who did send in contributions to the Amish cause even though they gained nothing in return for themselves.

The Amish had suffered long enough, and we were happy that our Supreme Court upheld our traditions. But when constitutional liberty is upheld, we all gain, as Justice Douglas put it in his opinion, "What we do here today . . . has given organized religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed."

PASTOR WILLIAM C. LINDHOLM,
Chairman, National Committee
for Amish Religious Freedom

Kansas City, Mo.

To the Editors: I'd like to set the record straight on my article, "Catholics and the Amish" [June 16.]

The article's subhead, "How pure were Catholic motives in supporting the Amish school case?," was a question posed by the editors of *Commonweal*; nowhere in the article did I personally question the motives of anyone involved in the case. In an attempt to put the case in perspective, however, it was necessary to discuss the advantages a verdict favorable to the Amish would have for Catholics.

JIM CASTELLI



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



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